Abstract. The European Union (EU) developed a state-building strategy for the aspiring member states in the Western Balkans. Demanding full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the EU made transitional justice part of the accession demands. Scholars have recently criticized the EU's limited focus on retributive justice as opposed to restorative justice. This paper goes beyond such impact-orientated analyses by asking why the EU engaged with retributive transitional justice in the fi rst place. The EU constructed ICTY-conditionality by mirroring its own post-Second World War experiences to the envisioned post-confl ict trajectory of the Western Balkans. The EU therefore expected the court to contribute to reconciliation, democratization and the rule of law. Using Serbia as a case study, this article examines the conditionality's context, specifi cities and discursive claims. Finally, it relates these fi ndings to the agenda of a promising regional initiative prioritizing restorative justice (RECOM) and sheds new light on the impact of ICTY-conditionality on transitional justice in the Western Balkans.
Introduction
When Yugoslavia fell apart in the fi rst half of the 1990s, the EU 1 was confronted with multiple violent confl icts in its immediate neighbourhood. After initial hesitation to intervene during the wars, the EU committ ed itself to post-confl ict peace-building. Because all Western Balkan countries were seeking EU membership in the course of the early 2000s, this peace-building engagement was institutionalized in the form of accession policy. A strong focus on democratization and rule of law characterized this enlargement framework. 2 As Soeren Keil and Zeynep Arkan recently demonstrated, the EU slowly but unmistakably took on the role of 'state builder'-albeit with litt le previous expertise and experience. 3 In this process, the Western Balkan countries were to become functional and democratic European member states. What is more, as Olivera Simić rightly highlighted, the EU expected these states to be 'able to deal with the past'. 4 The EU, therefore, augmented its accession demands to include so-called transitional justice. 5 As defi ned by the International Center for Transitional Justice, the leading expert institute, this is the 'set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by diff erent countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms.' 6 Academic literature often uses this distinction between judicial and non-judicial measures to analyse the diff erent goals of retributive and restorative justice. Whereas retributive justice aims to prosecute perpetrators for past crimes, restorative justice seeks to address the present needs of victims. 7 By making cooperation with the ICTY an absolute condition for membership, the EU strongly prioritized retributive justice mechanisms.
The EU's blindness to restorative justice in the Western Balkans is astonishing to scholars well aware of today's lessons on the need for victim-centred reconciliation. Experts now argue that the EU's focus on the ICTY was too narrow 8 and did not target civil society. 9 As a result, ICTY-conditionality failed to diff use norms of justice and reconciliation to the domestic realm. Although it was part of the EU's broader state-building eff orts, ICTY-conditionality did litt le to enhance processes of democratization and rule of law. 10 These analyses of ICTY-conditionality's impact are to the point and insightful.
However, the novelty of the EU's engagement with transitional justice merits critical exploration of the motives behind the incorporation of retributive justice as a state-building device. The expectations and 'construction and malleability' of a condition matt er, as Gwendolyn Sasse has underlined, in understanding its eventual impact. 11 Hence, this article consists of three parts, with Serbia as case study. In the fi rst part, I posit that the EU recognized its own war-torn history in the break-up of Yugoslavia. Mirroring its own post-Second World War experiences, the EU believed that ICTY-cooperation would contribute to reconciliation and to state-building in general.
The second part applies Dvora Yanow's method of interpretive policy analysis to various types of EU documents. 12 Reading 'back and forth' between 'policy or agency artifacts' as conveyers of meaning and 'context', I combine historical reconstruction with discourse analysis. 13 In this way, a fi rst subsection examines how the EU's expectations of retributive justice fi tt ed the international expectations surrounding the ICTY. A second subsection shows how these assumptions shaped the specifi c formulation, evaluation and implementation of the condition. The third subsection studies how the EU's historically informed expectations were refl ected in its discourse on the ICTY's contribution to reconciliation.
The last part of the article combines the fi ndings of the fi rst and second part to analyse the EU's justifi cations for ICTY-conditionality. These created a signifi cant 'discursive context for domestic actors, policies and institutions'. 14 This proves particularly relevant to understanding the potential of the RECOM initiative 15 aimed at restorative justice. This article acknowledges the valid critique that Europeanization often fails to take into account domestic factors. But instead of looking at this domestic context to explain the disappointing impact of the ICTY-conditionality, it fi nds elucidation within the EU's construction of this approach itself.
Designing a Post-Confl ict Trajectory towards Justice, Reconciliation and Democratization. The Western Balkans as the EU's Mirror Image
With the present academic att ention for transitional justice, it may be diffi cult to appreciate the novelty of the EU engaging with dealing with the past in the Western Balkans. Transitional justice was and is not a standard component of enlargement policy. 16 State-building, let alone transitional justice, had not been a part of accession conditionality towards the Central and Eastern European states, which struggled with a demanding post-communist transition. The EU favourably perceived these countries, entering the EU in 2004 and 2007, as 'young democracies' in need of mere 'institutional stability'. 17 In fact, the main EU institutions articulated that dealing with the past belonged to these states' national competence, and fell outside the EU ' European countries on its doorstep to 'confront the past'. Another explanation relies on the actual diff erent trajectories these countries followed. In the famous words of Winston Churchill, the Western Balkan region 'had produced far more history than they could possibly consume'. 19 The popularity of this quote, whether rightly or wrongly att ributed to Churchill, illustrates the widely held perception that the Western Balkans carried an even heavier burden of history than Central and Eastern Europe. Scholars and practitioners nonetheless apply the concept of transitional justice equally to post-communist and post-confl ict transition. Both types of transitions, despite their inherent diff erences, revolve around dilemmas of guilt, responsibility and accountability. 20 The EU's choice to commit itself to retributive transitional justice in the Western Balkans thus remains worthy of further examination.
The interest in dealing with the past in the Western Balkans, I argue, derived from the EU's own specifi c historical experiences and the memory thereof. In the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the EU discerned the old, now itate this process [ 21 Whereas the EU had litt le familiarity with communist authoritarianism, Yugoslavia had shown once more how nationalist confl ict could take a whole region to the brink of devastation. No matt er how complex and challenging, such violence was something that the EU had experience in overcoming.
In the EU's founding narrative, it was the coming together of former rivals that had paved the way for Western Europe's prosperous path to democracy after the destructive Second World War. Just as the French-German friendship had led to Western European integration, the EU understood reconciliation to be a prerequisite to transforming the Western Balkans into democratic EU member states. 22 In 2009, the European Parliament (EP) confi rmed that interethnic dialogue was needed to 'overcome both the burden of the past and tensions in relations between the countries of the Balkan region'. 23 In that same year, the European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn declared that the former Yugoslavia, like France and Germany some decades before, 'needs to overcome the wounds of the war' in order to become part of the 'European project'. 24 At an ICTY-conference in Brussels, he urged participants to 'defi nitely close the dark chapters of the recent Balkan wars, and allow the countries of the region to move towards EU integration'. 25 A speech from 2012 by Herman van Rompuy, then president of the European Council, is even more illustrative:
'Making peace to build the future: this is what France, Germany and others started, three generations ago. Substituting the bloody batt lefi elds with negotiation rooms in Brussels. Putt ing age-old rivalries about borders or minorities to rest, and replacing them with a will to live together, to belong together. These principles are still at the core of our Union. They still form a powerful force for change. 
From Expectations to Construction. Explaining the Specifi cities of ICTY-Conditionality

International and Historical Expectations. Retributive Justice as International Ideal and European Value
The EU's understanding of the reconciled, modern and democratic self was more than a mere inspirational narrative to transfer to the Western Balkans. It concretely shaped the EU's enlargement state-building strategy. The emphasis on 'regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations' is a fi rst indication of the practical implications of the EU's idea that 'being European' was the result of regional reconciliation. It formed a consistent element of the annual progress reports on Serbia and other communications issued by the European Commission (EC). 27 Progress on the EU membership path was not only a reward for and an indication of, but also 'the best way' for successfully addressing 'inter-ethnic or status issues' impeding regional stability. 28 This 'essential' process was evaluated beyond concrete diplomatic activity. 29 32 for example, testify to the EU's appreciation of both political and sociocultural cross-border regional cooperation in line with its own inclusive understanding of post-war regional reconciliation. Other important regional reconciliation tools were diplomatic apologies and war-crimes prosecution, with the EU's demand for ICTY-cooperation thus serving both as indicator of good regional relations and as accession criterion in itself.
This focus on retributive justice derived from the EU's projection of its own experiences with the Nuremberg trials onto the Western Balkans. The Nuremberg court prosecuted several perpetrators and, according to many, brought justice to a devastated continent by focusing on individual criminal responsibility. 33 For the longest time, this European success story, together with similar trials in Tokyo, was the world's fi rst encounter with international criminal justice. Although the idea did not disappear after Nuremberg and Tokyo, the bipolar world after 1950 lacked a 'neutral' space that could facilitate another international court. 34 However, the confl icts in the former Yugoslavia coincided with the end of the Cold War. This created the perfect conditions for the United Nations (UN) to establish the ICTY in 1993. Specifi cally, Serbia's cooperation with the ICTY, as the country hosting the most indictees, became the 'test case' 35 or 'laboratory' 36 of this long-awaited second chance to realize the ideal of international criminal justice. At fi rst, the EU depicted its ICTY-conditionality as an eff ective means to enforce Serbia's compliance with retributive justice as an international obligation. In the course of years, the EU increasingly portrayed Serbia's cooperation with the court as a symbol of the state's 'Europeanness'. At the Western Balkans summit in Thessaloniki in 2003, the EU had declared with regards to the ICTY that 'providing justice for war crimes is a legal, political and moral imperative to which we [not specifi ed, N.W.] are all committ ed'. 37 When Radovan Karadžić was arrested in July 2008, the notion of 'becoming European' had apparently entered the discourse. Rehn enthusiastically welcomed the arrest of this suspect, charged with a wide variety of war crimes, as a 'milestone' in Serbia's path 'towards a European future'. 38 The spokesperson for Rehn's colleague Javier Solana emphasized the 'excellent operation' of the Serbian authorities that 'will bring Serbia closer to European values'. 39 In 2011, van Rompuy connected the two tiers. Shortly after the arrest of Ratko Mladić, a Bosnian Serb commander charged with various crimes including the genocide in Srebrenica, van Rompuy congratulated Serbian president Boris Tadić with this accomplishment 'not only for Serbia, but for the region and international justice as well'. 40 Two months later, van Rompuy depicted the arrest of Goran Hadžić as 'a further important step for Serbia in realising its European perspective' and 'equally crucial for international justice'. 41 It is worth noting that to a certain extent this duality was adopted in Serbian discourse as well. In Serbia's National Programme for EU integration of 2009, ICTY-cooperation is the fi rst topic in the subsection of 'international obligations'. As the document states, Serbia considers cooperation with the court 'primarily […] a European identity. Through retributive justice in the form of ICTY-cooperation, Serbia was supposed to achieve reconciliation that would contribute to regional stability and enable the EU to build a successful member state.
Practicalities of Conditionality. Formulating, Evaluating, and Implementing Retributive Justice
As the perceived basis for a European, democratic future, cooperation with the ICTY became a non-negotiable part of the membership demands. The EU hence used its most powerful instrument of 'reinforcement by reward': full conditionality. 43 Progress reports and other EC communications consistently and elaborately discussed ICTY-cooperation. 44 In the important Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), signed in 2008, Article 4 referred to 'full cooperation with the ICTY'. 45 The broad formulation of the condition allowed for various components of cooperation, including archival disclosure, fact-fi nding, information sharing and extraditions to the ICTY. The EC's annual progress reports, which assessed Serbia's eff orts towards EU membership, refl ected the wide scope of this defi nition. The documents from 2006 onwards all started with a reference to the progress made. They emphasized the government's 'good work concerning waiver or witnesses and access to documents', 46 52 Nonetheless, the evaluation of the condition was eventually rather negative. The progress reports concluded that 'full cooperation' with the ICTY was not achieved yet because of the remaining fugitives. 53 More specifi cally, all reports referred to the necessity of Mladić's arrest. 54 In an adopted resolution, the EP reminded Serbia that 'only apprehension and extradition of the fugitives to The Hague can be deemed the most convincing evidence of full cooperation'. 55 After the 2011 extradition of Hadžić as the last remaining fugitive, the EC and EP indeed declared that Serbia's ICTY-cooperation had achieved a 'fully' and 'entirely' 'satisfactory level'. 56 The subcriterion of fugitives' arrest thus dominated the assessment of full cooperation with remarkable consistency.
Although this stern evaluation leads one to expect a similarly strict implementation, sanctions and rewards were adjusted to the domestic political situation in Serbia. The combination of the condition's width in formulation and fi rmness of evaluation enabled the EU to 'incentivise and bargain' with relevant pro-reform 49 When the EU stepped up its pressure in 2006, the political power balance in Serbia was stark and fi xed. Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica had limited room for political manoeuvring, because his party relied on the support of the geopolitically conservative Socialists-not to mention that he was already a stark opponent of the ICTY, which he accused of being an 'American court'. 59 Unwilling and unable to give in to the EU's pressure, he therefore declared that 'Mladić is hiding all by himself'. 60 Prompted by this reluctant att itude, the EU made continuation of the SAA negotiations conditional upon Mladić's extradition. Having once extended the deadline due to Serbian promises, on 3 May the EU decided to block the negotiations when these promises proved hollow. The Netherlands, as an individual member state, played a signifi cant role in this decision. While the head of the delegation responsible for EU negotiations, Miroljub Labus, resigned, the Serbian government continued its work without major changes and without strengthening its eff orts to capture Mladić. 61 It would take more than a year for the SAA negotiations to be resumed. 62 In January 2008 the EU's aim was the same. Nevertheless, both the political situation and the EU's strategy were diff erent-and so was the outcome. Since 2007, a more pro-EU coalition had come to power in Serbia. Despite failing to capture Mladić, the coalition improved ICTY-cooperation. The new government had already managed to reopen the frozen SAA negotiations in June 2007. 63 The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in the fi rst half of 2008 further added to this political momentum. Perhaps recognizing this timely opportunity, in January 2008 the Netherlands again used its power as an individual member state to prevent the SAA from entering into force. Similar to the situation in 2006, this decision was based on Serbia's failure to arrest the remaining fugitives, notably Mladić. Refusing to make Serbia's broken promise an absolute stalemate in this stage of the negotiations, the other member states did not follow the Dutch initiative. Instead, the EU designed a temporary agreement, hoping to mobilize domestic progressive forces. 64 Rehn, for instance, told the press that the Serbian citizens were about to choose 'between a nationalist past and a European future'. 65 Solana stated that the EU had to show its 'commitment to get Serbia as close as possible to the EU'. 66 'We have not forgott en all the conditions', Dimitrij Rupel declared, 'we thought it was important to give Serbia signals at this point of time'. 67 Serbia's pro-reform party, as was hoped, won the subsequent elections, 68 leading to what Adam Fagan dubs a 'shift towards cooperation with the demands of the EU'. 69 Several authors have tried to explain this surprisingly lenient gesture. 70 It stands in striking contrast to the popular academic view that enlargement fatigue led to an increasingly severe accession policy. 71 If the member states indeed felt that further enlargement was undesirable or simply too bothersome, the Dutch reluctance would have off ered a perfect pretext to again halt negotiations with Serbia. Security considerations can perhaps explain this seemingly unlikely choice. With Russia's intervention in Georgia and the Arab spring, from an EU perspective the security situation in the Caucasus and the Middle East had worsened. This pushed the EC in 2008 and 2011 to emphasize the need for 'political stability' in the candidate member states. 72 Moreover, EC enlargement strategies reveal that the EU increasingly held a credible membership perspective, and thus commitment to its own promises, as being essential in enforcing reforms. 73 A third reason may again be found in the EU's own experiences with transitional justice. The EU expected Serbia eventually to be willing to do justice and reconcile with its neighbours, as archenemies France and Germany had supposedly done. Enforcing ICTY-cooperation was, after all, part of the EU's state-building strategy. By allowing for negotiation and delay in arresting indictees, the EU could try to infl uence domestic politics. This illustrates how retributive justice, as demanded by the EU, eventually had to serve democratization and the rule of law in the Western Balkans.
The previous sections linked the EU's expectations of retributive justice, as part of its state-building strategy, to the construction of ICTY-conditionality. Here, the question of eff ectiveness inevitably arises. Because the focus of this paper lies with the conditionality itself, I will rely here on the most recent conclusions of thorough scholarly work rather than on primary material and reconstruction. As shown by Europeanization scholars looking at the issue through a mainly rationalist lens, contributing to our understanding of the EU's carrot-and-stick approach, conditionality was certainly eff ective in enforcing ICTY-cooperation and infl uencing political constellations, especially in comparison with other international bodies. 74 Research using a socialization approach has nuanced these conclusions. In the case of Croatia, Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter demonstrated that conditionality's demands often proved incompatible with 'national identity'. Even if cooperation was not politically costly, such a clash resulted in non-compliance. 75 It is, however, important to look beyond a simple dichotomy of compliance and non-compliance. Instead of looking at eff ectiveness, these constructivist scholars indeed aimed to study impact. The EU's politically sensitive approach, as described previously, raised possibilities of 'fake compliance' or 'imposed compliance', to use some apt terms from Gergana Noutcheva. 76 This constructivist input has helped us realize that Europeanization does not only consist of transfer of policies and standards. It includes the complex transfer of norms, values and practices that are more diffi cult to measure but at least as important in the process of becoming an EU state. For the case of Serbia, several authors have in that light articulated how even formal compliance with ICTY-cooperation did not result in genuine recognition of the court's legitimacy. 77 Jelena Subotić and Marlene Spoerri, for example, found that the majority of Serbian political actors have never acknowledged justice as a moral necessity. Just as the nationalist discourse in the wake of the refugee crisis and the Turkish coup d'état seemed to intensify rather than retreat after the EU's repeated att empts to enforce norms of solidarity, democracy and human rights, the EU's constant articulation of the norms of justice, peace and reconciliation in the case of ICTY-cooperation has arguably armoured nationalist elites. Depicting ICTY-cooperation merely as a pragmatic choice with direct economic and political benefi ts, they could mobilize support around their dismissal of the norms the EU membership prospect was expected to enhance. 78 
Claims and Discourse. A Retributive Court as Generator of Restorative Justice
Research thus found a discrepancy between Serbian politicians' compliance with ICTY-conditionality and their internalization of the norms supposedly represented by the ICTY. The disappointing impact of ICTY-conditionality can be explained in terms of a 'mismatch' between the expectations and values embodied by the court, on the one hand, and the concrete conditionality designed to enforce cooperation, on the other hand. The next step in this article, and as I would argue for Europeanization literature in general, is therefore to look again at the claims and expectations of the EU as instigator of the Europeanization process. Admitt edly, it seems highly ironic to advocate for this shift back to the EU-level now that scholars have only just recognized the importance of studying the complex and contradictory dynamics of domestic receptivity. As this section will illustrate, however, it is exactly the EU's conviction that Serbia's 76 Noutcheva, European Foreign Policy. 77 Dragović-Soso / Gordy, Coming to Terms with the Past, 197; Noutcheva, European Foreign Policy, 12; Spoerri, Justice Imposed, 1841; Subotić, Hijacked Justice. 78 Spoerri, Justice Imposed; Subotić, Hijacked Justice, 46.
transitional justice process was to be modelled on EU experience that is key to understanding how ICTY-cooperation within the Serbian context acquired political meanings so diff erent from the norms envisioned by the EU. The causal relation between international criminal justice and state-building, from an EU perspective, lies in the ICTY's contribution to reconciliation and peace. This three-layered narrative of justice as a step towards reconciliation, which in turn leads to state-building, followed the notion of the Nuremberg court as facilitator of Western European integration. Nuremberg had allegedly paved the way for Western European powers to reconcile peacefully. On the basis of this reconciliation, the former enemies could become one Europe, united by democratization and rule of law. 79 This EU understanding actually happened to fi t in well with the broader discourse of transitional justice, used by practitioners and politicians, as well as scholars. They increasingly embraced international criminal justice as the basis for reconciliation and peace. UN Security Council documents establishing the ICTY confi rmed this idea. They stressed the court's contribution to 'lasting peace', 'restoration and maintenance of peace' and '(national) reconciliation'. 80 The ICTY accordingly states on its website that it strives to 'fulfi l its mandate of contributing to peace and security in the region'. 81 Even today, scholars defend this idea of the ICTY being the essential constituent of transitional justice and thus of reconciliation and peace. 82 After an initial trend to focus on the incompatibility of justice and peace, the academic fi eld now considers them to be mutually enforcing.
However, since the nineties, the academic and practitioners' understanding of transitional justice has quickly evolved. It did not move back to the peace-versus-justice debate, but instead expanded the concept of this justice required to pave the way for peace. Many now emphasize the importance of restorative justice as, at the very least, a complementary mechanism to courts. Recent studies therefore refute the EU's expectation that a single international criminal court, located within the realm of retributive justice, could further restorative goals. 83 Fact-fi nding, truth commissions, local initiatives and the involvement of civil society are necessary components of a complete approach to justice that enables long-lasting reconciliation and peace. 84 Shifting att itudes within the ICTY refl ect this change. 85 The ICTY's personnel generally believe that their main priority lies with prosecution and investigation. They express modesty towards the court's claimed potential for reconciliation. Many believe this can only be an additional and intended consequence of their core task to bring retributive justice. 86 The ICTY adopted an outreach programme meant to enhance the court's positive impact on peace and reconciliation, but the UN did not consider this a 'core activity'. As a result, the outreach programme relied almost exclusively on donations by the EC. 87 The EU, meanwhile, severed rather than loosened the discursive link between the ICTY and reconciliation and peace. While an EP resolution from 2007 had already described ICTY-cooperation as 'a key step towards achieving lasting reconciliation in the region', 88 since 2009 the EU has consistently emphasized this connection, especially in EC enlargement strategies and EP recommendations and resolutions. The EC dubbed cooperation an 'essential' condition and 'key' in achieving 'lasting reconciliation in the region'. 89 As early as 2009 the EP had concluded that the ICTY had 'already made a signifi cant contribution' to reconciliation and peace in the region. 90 In 2009 and 2012 the EP urged the Western Balkan societies to see extraditions of war criminals as not only a membership condition, but 'above all a step towards bringing justice to the victims […] and reconciliation in the region'. 91 When in 2011 the last remaining fugitives of the ICTY were arrested, the EC praised the extraditions of Mladić and Hadžić as 'marking an important step towards reconciliation'. 92 The conditionality's focus on arrests was thus directly connected to the EU's broader expectations of the court's restorative potential. This link permeated the Serbian side of the diplomatic relations, with offi cial documents declaring that 'an awareness has been developed that fulfi lment of the ICTY's mandate will contribute to the reconciliation among peoples in the region'. 93 With this discourse, the EU actively carried out a message that was debated within the wider academic community and that even went beyond claims of the court itself.
A New Take on the Impact of Conditionality. Balancing Retributive and Restorative Justice
This article has illustrated that the justifi cation for ICTY-conditionality rested upon two pillars. First, the EU enforced ICTY-cooperation as an international obligation to which all Western Balkan states had to adhere. Second, based upon its own experiences with the Nuremberg trials, the EU became the most vocal supporter of the ICTY's contribution to reconciliation as a fi rst step towards state-building. Combining the two, the EU established the ICTY as an international retributive court in a discourse of restorative justice. This, I argue here, raises a new perspective that helps in seeing the complexities and nuances of ICTY-conditionality's impact.
There are two ways to interpret the impact of this duality. Spoerri concluded in 2011 that the EU's carrot-and-stick policy revolving around deadlines and rewards, as explored already in this paper, drew att ention away from the ICTY's and other initiatives' restorative potential. 94 Here, the focus is on the EU's failure to enhance restorative justice. The second way to interpret the impact does not necessarily refute this analysis, but it derives from a diff erent logic. Instead of arguing that the EU should have done more to further the ICTY's restorative potential, I posit that it was exactly the ICTY's restorative discourse that turned out to be the most problematic part of the EU's approach. Close examination of a quote by Heather Grabbe illustrates the far-reaching implications of the EU's consistent emphasis on the ICTY's contribution to reconciliation. Commenting on the arrest of Mladić in 2011, Rehn's senior advisor described the breakthrough 'as a symbol that Serbia is ready to put the past behind it'. 95 This enabled domestic actors to see ICTY-cooperation on par with successfully dealing with the past. Politicians interested in distorting transitional justice could thus deny the importance of domestic initiatives aimed at restorative justice.
Both analyses of the ICTY-conditionality's impact are challenged by reference to a recent, promising initiative from the region that actually received EU support from its start. 96 Resembling the current emphasis on restorative justice, RECOM's approach exceeds the defi nition of international criminal justice as used by the ICTY. In terms of goals, it presents itself as complementary to the ICTY. 98 It acknowledges that the ICTY has been of major importance to achieving legal justice and holds that this paved the way for such a truth-fi nding initiative. The founders conclude that true and fully satisfactory justice requires a focus on the victims' needs for truth and restorative justice. 99 The EC and EP have recognized and supported RECOM in their reports and resolutions as well as in terms of fi nancial help. 100 They have praised the initiative's potential for reconciliation in the region, especially after the arrests of the last ICTY-fugitives. 101 RECOM's founders diff er in their evaluation of EU support, but generally agree that the endorsement of the EC especially will have a positive impact on RECOM's work. 102 The EU's, albeit relatively modest, support for RECOM puts my puzzle in a new perspective. At the very least, the fi ndings add nuance to the dominant academic view that the EU was mostly, if not exclusively, committ ed to straightforward compliance with the ICTY for the mere sake of arresting fugitives. The analysis moreover indicates that the EU did acknowledge restorative justice as a legitimate part of transitional justice. Yet does that also att est to true recognition of the urgent need for restorative transitional justice mechanisms in the Western Balkans? The discourse of restorative justice was far from new because the EU had used it to justify its ICTY-conditionality. RECOM was therefore quite straightforwardly incorporated in this same discourse. This undermined acknowledgement of RECOM's novelty and potential. Whereas the EU seemed to understand that RECOM wishes to 'follow-up' on the ICTY's work, the EU did litt le to stress the essentially diff erent approaches of both institutions.
In that sense, president of the Humanitarian Law Centre Nataša Kandić's warning is still valid: political actors uninterested in resolving questions of truth and accountability can claim that with the end of Serbia's ICTY-cooperation 'the general process of dealing with the past has been concluded too'. 103 Now that all fugitives have been arrested and the ICTY is to close down in the foreseeable future, this is all the more relevant. By incorporating the ICTY in its state-building strategy, the EU has associated itself with transitional justice in practice as well as in discourse. Serbian politicians could thus present every step towards the EU, most notably Serbia's acquisition of candidate member status in 2012, as a step towards successfully dealing with the past. The enlargement strategy needs to overcome the comparison with the Nuremberg trials-a parallel based on an identity narrative rather than sound history-to underscore both the actual value and limitations of the ICTY. In short, the EU needs to acknowledge that the process of restorative justice still has to start.
Conclusion
This paper combines historical reconstruction and interpretive policy analysis to help in understanding how the EU's expectations of post-confl ict transition shaped ICTY-conditionality. Instead of looking directly for the impact of the EU's disregard for restorative justice, this paper asks why the EU chose to engage with retributive transitional justice. This leads to new insights with which to evaluate the impact of ICTY-conditionality.
The EU projected its own post-Second World War foundational narrative on the war-torn Western Balkans. In parallel with the perceived successes of Nuremberg, the ICTY's retributive justice was expected to lead to reconciliation, as a basis for building future European member states. Conditionality as the 'cornerstone' 104 of enlargement proved eff ective in enforcing this cooperation. However, this tool also had a problematic side. Formulated broadly, evaluated narrowly and implemented fl exibly, it made the notion of justice vulnerable to political opportunism and distortion. This became even more problematic in the wider restorative-justice discourse of peace and reconciliation in which the EU embedded the ICTY-condition. In parallel with the Nuremberg trials, which were understood to have paved the way for the peaceful and democratic Western European future, the EU consistently emphasized that ICTY-cooperation would lead to reconciliation as the foundation for democratization and rule of law. This causal link has received its fair share of criticism from practitioners, including those within the ICTY, and academics alike. Recent initiatives like RECOM try to make up for the exclusive focus on retributive justice. There is a risk, nevertheless, that the EU's discourse of the ICTY's contribution to reconciliation limits RECOM's restorative potential.
Thus, parallel to the need for Europeanization scholars to rethink the meaning and impact of the EU's expectations, the EU itself needs to acknowledge that the question 'what is best for Serbia?' is too simplistically answered: 'that which is best for the EU'. It is not diffi cult to understand how Eurosceptic and nationalist elites could use this to their advantage, creating a schism between the EU's att empted state-building and these elites' envisioned nation-building. This line of thought becomes even more pressing if we consider the ongoing fragmentation in the EU over the bailout of Greece and the so-called 'refugee crisis'. If the EU could not fi nd the glue to hold it together, nor defi ne its identity, but did project its own experiences on a topic so contested and sensitive to nationalism as dealing with the past, then what exactly did it off er to the Western Balkans?
This article, however, also proposes a more optimistic prospect for Europeanization scholars and the EU. This is based on another, by now widely accepted, conclusion of Europeanization: norms transfer is, or should always be, a twoway process. 105 While RECOM as a regional project showed the defi ciencies in the EU's transitional justice approach, it also benefi ted from the strong, albeit insuffi cient, incorporation of transitional justice in the EU's state-building strategy. If the EU gradually extends its priorities to inclusive transitional justice, inspired by RECOM's bott om-up input, 106 this may grant the political legitimacy normally reserved for the 'hard' ambitions of democratization and rule of law to the often considered 'soft' restorative-justice goals. Future follow-up research may conclude that ICTY-conditionality has made regional leaders acknowledge transitional justice as a standard component of political transition. Such recognition can be the 'missing link' between justice, reconciliation and state-building in the Western Balkans. 106 In 2012, the EP adopted a resolution that emphasized the importance of civil society in enhancing reconciliation and urged the EC to support such initiatives aimed at increasing tolerance and dialogue. European Parliament, Consolidating Stability and Prosperity in the Western Balkans.
